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Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age 
dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving 
transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent 
to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent 
of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains 
of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary 
importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income. 
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1. Introduction 
In a highly influential paper Akerlof (1978) demonstrated how redistribution can be achieved 
at lower efficiency costs if different tax schedules apply to different subgroups of the 
population; “tagging” schemes are always welfare-enhancing as long as the distributions of 
wage rates (abilities) differ across the subgroups. Over time this idea has gained considerable 
attention and presently there is large interest in tagging and optimal income taxation. The 
workings of such schemes have recently been studied by, for example, Immonen et al. (1998), 
Boadway and Pestieau (2006), Alesina et al. (2010), Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) and 
Cremer et al. (2010).  
In most countries it is easy to observe individuals’ age and this makes feasible to 
divide the population into age groups. Furthermore, the distribution of wage rates differs by 
age, the average wage being higher for older cohorts and the dispersion of wages wider. 
Hence, one particular form of tagging is to make the tax schedule dependent on age. In the 
Mirrlees Review (Banks and Diamond (2010)) this is mentioned as one very promising way 
to improve the tax system. In contrast to other tagging schemes suggested in the literature, 
such as tagging by gender or individuals’ height, tagging by age is probably politically 
feasible.  
As a matter of fact, there are already elements of age-dependence in the tax and 
transfer- systems of many countries. For example, in Sweden the payroll tax recently became 
differentiated by age. However, these age dependencies are based on ad hoc reasoning and are 
not the result of a thorough analysis. There is therefore a need for a systematic analysis and a 
characterization of an optimal age dependent income tax. Because there are important aspects 
of tagging by age that make it different from other forms of tagging, the analyses of tagging 
schemes in earlier articles are not directly applicable to the case of tagging by age. Earlier 
analyses of tagging schemes have considered atemporal models where each individual 
belongs to only one group. The study of an age-dependent tax requires instead an 
intertemporal model; moreover, in contrast to other tagging schemes, a given individual will 
over time belong to different (age) groups. Finally, an individual can via savings redistribute 
income between himself at different ages.  
Age-dependent taxes have been studied in a few earlier papers. Kremer (2002) is an 
interesting early contribution. However, he did not consider intertemporal aspects, hence 
abstracted from savings decisions. Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Lozachmeur (2006) studied 
age-dependent taxes in dynamic models with a representative agent. Their papers did not 
therefore address the issue of income redistribution. Blomquist and Micheletto (2003, 2008)   2
provided the first analysis of an age-dependent tax in an intertemporal model with 
heterogeneous individuals who face a stochastic wage process and can save. Using an 
overlapping generations (OLG) model they characterized the optimal marginal labor income 
taxes and the optimal tax on savings. They also showed that a strict Pareto improvement can 
be obtained by moving from an age-independent to an age-dependent labor income tax. 
However, the quantitative importance of the welfare gains was not assessed.   
In this paper we quantify the potential welfare gains of making the income tax age-
dependent, as well as characterize the shape of an optimal age-dependent income tax.
1 Our 
ambition is that the results should be policy relevant, and for this purpose we construct a 
model capturing important features of the real economy. We also make observational 
assumptions that only require information of the type used by current tax systems, plus 
information on the individuals’ age. This means that we rule out the possibility of levying 
taxes that are dependent on the income history of individuals. Although analyses of history-
dependent taxes are of interest, we believe that such tax systems are far off into the future.
2  
The potential gains of age-dependent nonlinear income taxes as compared to age-
independent ones are threefold.  First, the self-selection constraints are less severe under an 
age-dependent tax as mimicking across different age groups is ruled out. This is the benefit 
analyzed in Blomquist and Micheletto (2008) and Weinzierl (2008). In both these papers it is 
assumed that the interest rate and the wage rates are fixed. This means that the capital 
accumulation process and the role of the capital stock for the interest- and wage rates are 
neglected. In this article we take account of the capital accumulation. With unrestricted public 
debt it is possible to reach the optimal (golden rule) level of capital accumulation both under 
an age-dependent and an age-independent tax. However, in reality there might be restrictions 
on the debt policy. The tax instruments could then be used to control the capital stock. For the 
age-dependent tax it is the case that the capital stock can be perfectly controlled without 
interfering with the self-selection constraints or the redistributional goals. Thus, even if debt 
policy cannot be used to control the capital stock, under an age-dependent tax we are still able 
(and we still want) to achieve the golden rule. This is the second advantage of an age-
                                                 
1 Weinzierl (2008) provided a first contribution where a quantitative assessment of the welfare gains is 
attempted. However, as we will clarify below, there are many distinctive features between our model and the 
model by Weinzierl. For instance, we explicitly model the production side of the economy, and this allows us to 
consider the interaction between age-dependent taxes and the capital accumulation process. Moreover, we 
consider age-dependency both in the context of linear- as well as nonlinear taxation schemes, and we also deal 
with the interaction between age-dependency and optimal capital income taxation.    
2 See, e.g., Golosov et al. (2006) for a study where taxes can be conditioned on the earnings history of agents.    3
dependent tax. Contrarily, for the age-independent tax there is a conflict between controlling 
the capital stock while at the same time guaranteeing incentive-compatibility of the 
allocations intended for the various types of agents. This implies that, in the presence of 
restrictions on debt policy, an optimal nonlinear age-independent tax will in general not yield 
the golden rule. The third advantage of an age-dependent tax is computational. As will be 
illustrated below, it is computationally much more difficult to find an optimum for the 
nonlinear age-independent tax problem due to the larger set of incentive-compatibility 
constraints. When computing the optimal nonlinear income tax for actual economies, 
approximations of the wage processes must be calculated. For the age-independent tax the 
approximations must, for computational reasons, be much cruder than for the age-dependent 
tax. Although this advantage of the age-dependent tax is hard to quantify, in practice it might 
be quite important. 
As we have mentioned above, one of the advantages of a nonlinear age-dependent tax 
is the reduction in the number of self-selection constraints, since under an age-dependent tax 
an individual cannot choose an income point intended for an agent belonging to a different 
age group. To model this feature in a proper way, we need a model where at each point in 
time the economy is populated by individuals of different ages. For this reason we use an 
OLG model as a workhorse for our analysis. Moreover, to endogenize the interest- and wage 
rates, we explicitly model the production side of the economy. 
Our OLG model has individuals living for three periods, two where they work and one 
where they are retired. The last period is needed to generate a reasonable pattern of savings 
and capital accumulation. We can think of each period in our model as corresponding to 
something like 20 calendar years.  
The shape of the optimal tax schedules depends on the first and second period wage 
distributions, and the Markov probabilities that relate wages in the two working periods. We 
have chosen to calibrate our model to wage data for both the United States and Swedish 
economy. These are two countries that sometimes are regarded as two extremes in terms of 
wage dispersion. Our calculations focus on how the age-dependent taxes should be designed, 
as well as the gains obtained by moving from an age-independent tax to an age-dependent tax.  
Since we want to compare an optimal age-independent nonlinear income tax with an 
optimal age-dependent nonlinear income tax, computational feasibility requires us to keep the 
number of skill types in each period low, as for instance three types in the first period and four 
in the second. Even with this restriction the age-independent tax schedule in particular is still 
difficult to compute as in conjunction with our rich economic environment it admits complex   4
mimicking behaviors, giving rise to a very large number of incentive constraints. The 
computational difficulties are also the reason why we will not analyze the transition from an 
age-independent to an age-dependent tax, but focus instead on steady-states. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic structure of our 
model. In section 3, in order to convey in the simplest way the importance of the information 
on individuals’ age, we consider the First Best solution to a simplified version of our model. 
We show that the social planner achieve the First Best only if it can use the information on 
both individuals’ age and productivities. In section 4 we first set up the government’s 
problems under an optimal age-dependent and age-independent nonlinear income tax, and 
discuss how the number of self-selection constraints depends on the number of skill types in 
the economy. We then move on to describe the government’s problems under an optimal age-
independent and age-dependent linear income tax. In section 5 we describe how we calibrate 
our model. In section 6 we present the results of our simulations. Among our results, we find 
that a move from a nonlinear age-independent tax to a nonlinear age-dependent tax yields a 
welfare gain of about 3% of GDP. We also find that the gains of using a nonlinear tax instead 
of a linear tax are substantial (about twice the size of the welfare gains from age-dependency), 
whereas setting the interest income tax at the optimal rate is of second order importance in 
most cases. Finally, section 8 offers concluding remarks.  
2. The model 
We consider a discrete time OLG economy with heterogeneous agents living for three 
periods, working during the first two periods and being retired in the last period. Agents are 
indexed by their productivity and age, and start out their lives as one of    possible 
productivity types. We denote a young agents' productivity by 
y m
, i θ  with  , and 
assume that the proportion of young agents of type i is 
{ }
y m ∈ 1,..., i
i p , with  1 i p =
i ∑ . With probability 
ij p  an agent who is of productivity i in the first period of his worklife (when young) will 





, in the second period (when middle-aged), where 
,  0 ≥ ij p ( , ) { } 1,...,
y o m × ij m ∀∈  and  1 ij
j
p = ∑ . Introducing the notation  {1,..., }
y I m =  
and , we interpret  {1,..., }
o Jm = σ θ  as referring to the productivity of a middle aged agent if σ  
is a tuple  , and as referring to the productivity of a young agent if  (, ) ij I J ∈× σ  is a single 
index iI .  ∈  5
Labor supply and consumption of a young agent of type i born in period t is denoted 
by   and  respectively, whereas   and   denote the labor supply and consumption of 
a j-type middle aged agent (therefore born in 
, it   , it c , ij t   , ij t c
t 1 − ) who was of type i when young. In the 
third period of their lifetime, agents are retired and we denote by c  the consumption in 
period  t of a retiree who was of type i when young and of type j when middle aged. 
Population grows at rate n starting from an initial size  . Thus, the size of the cohort born at 
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whereas total effective labor and consumption in the economy is given by  




tt n L =+  
()
t
tt CN n C =+  
0 1
Firms operate a CRS technology   admitting zero equilibrium profits. The 
capital depreciation rate, the interest rate and the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor are 
denoted respectively by 
( , ) tt FK L
δ ,   and  t r t ω . With perfectly competitive markets, factors earn their 
marginal products and we have  ' t rf ( ) k t δ =−  and  ( ) '( ) tt t t f kk f k ω = −
t L
, where we have used 
the relationship  , with  () tt L= ( ) t k , FK t f L / tt kK ≡ . An agent’s labor income is defined as 
the product of labor in efficiency units and the equilibrium wage rate:  ,, , it t i it it it yw , ωθ =≡     
and  ,, , ij t ij t yw , ij t t ij ij t ωθ =≡    .  
We will consider labor income tax systems of the form  , where   is 
the tax function that applies to young agents and   the tax function for middle aged 
agents.
12 {() , ( ) } ii j Ty Ty 1() T i
2() T i
() ij T y
3 This formulation admits taxes depending both on an agent's income and age, but does 
not admit taxes which depend on the income history of an agent.
4 For future use we define 
after-tax incomes as   and by 1() ii i by T y =− 2 ij ij = − . A key assumption that we make is 
that savings can only be observed anonymously. That is, savings can be observed, but it 
cannot be observed who is the beneficiary of the savings. This implies that the returns on 
                                                 
() 12 () T ≠ ii
3 We will maintain this notation throughout the paper keeping in mind that under an age-dependent tax we will 
have T , whereas under an age-independent tax we will have  ( ) 12 () . T = ii
(, ) ii j y
T  
4 A history-dependent tax function would have the more general non-separable form Ty .   6
savings can only be taxed at a proportional rate  K τ .
5 In each period individual preferences are 
represented by a twice-differentiable, strictly quasi-concave utility function   where 
and  . Hence, the expected lifetime utility of an agent with productivity i when 
young is given by: 
( , ) tt uc  
, , , / t it it s y w −
()
0 c u > 0 u <  
it  
2
,, , , 1 , 2 , , (,) ( ) ( ) ( )
R
it it i j i jt i jt it i
j
Vu c pu c u c u b ββ + ⎡⎤ =+ + = ⎣⎦ ∑   
() ()
, 1 , i jt ++ +
( ( )) ,2 1 K t ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
2
, ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 (1 1 / ) 1 i t K t ij t ij ij t ij t s r s w u s r βτ β τ ++ + + + + + ++ − − + + ,1 ij t b ,1 , t y .
1
ij
j ∑ pu  
For given values of  ,,, ,, it it i jt byb +  and  , ij t y 1 + , an individual chooses first- and second 
period savings   and   maximizing the above expression. It should be noted that when a 
young individual plans his second period savings, he will plan to save different amounts 
depending on what productivity type he will turn out to be when middle aged. 
, ij t s +1 , it s
t
We define aggregate savings in the following way. The aggregate savings of 
generation   is given by  , tt t ii t
i
Ns N ps = ∑  and the aggregate savings in period t of the 
generation born in period t-1 is given by  11 t Ns −− 1 , t t i ij ij t
ij
N p p s − = ∑ . Agents invest either in 
government bonds   or in physical capital  t D t I . Equilibrium in the capital market requires: 
  11 . tt t t DI N N s t t s        (1)                      − − + =+
t I
The capital stock in period  , net of what is left after depreciation of the capital stock in 
period t, is equal to that part of investment that goes into physical capital in period t:  
1 t +
  11 (1 ) . tt t t t t KK N s N s 1 t D δ +− −− ≡ + − −
1 t +
  (2)   =
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and simplifying we get: 
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where we have defined: 
 
5 If one tried to tax savings through a nonlinear function, there would be large incentives for someone with a 
high marginal tax on savings to ask a friend, with a lower marginal tax, to save for him. Our assumption here 
parallels the one usually made about purchases of commodities: anonymous transactions can be observed and 
taxed by a proportional tax, but personal consumption levels are not publicly observable. See Hammond (1987) 
on the desirability of linear pricing when exchanges on side market are not observable by the government.   7
  11 / tt dD N t + + ≡ . 
Defining debt in this way emphasizes that debt decided upon at t is at time   held by the 
larger population . As in Diamond (1965), we will restrict attention to debt which is 
constant per young worker. Thus, 
1 t +
1 t N +
t dd = , t ∀ . 
In period 0 the initial capital stock   and the labor supplied by the young and middle 
aged agents are combined to produce output. The law of motion for capital is:  
0 K
 
1 (1 ) ( , ) . tt t t t K KF K LC δ + =− + −            (3) 
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which can be simplified to: 
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t − .     (5) 
Combining the resource constraint (5), the private budget constraints relating before- 
to after-tax income, the definitions of   and  , and the capital market equilibrium 
condition, one can derive the following government’s budget constraint: 
t C t L
,2
,
1, , , 2, , , , 1 1
1
() ( ) ( 1 )( 1 )
11 1
ii j i j t
ij Kt t
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We are now in a position to give the following definition: 
 
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) 
Given a tax policy 1, 2, , 0 {( ) , () , } ti ti j K t t TyTyτ
∞
= , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of 
prices , individual allocations  0 {, } tt t r ω
∞
= ,,,, ,, 0 ( , ) , , , , , } } ti j ti ti j ti ti j t t i j I J cc ss
∞ {{ i = ∈×    , production plans 
 and government debt 0 } tt t
∞
= {, KL 0 {} tt D
∞
=  such that individual allocations solve the individual 
maximization problems, factors are paid their marginal product, the production (feasibility) 
constraint is satisfied and factor markets clear. 
 
   8
Definition 2 (Stationary Equilibrium) 
A stationary equilibrium is such that, for all periods  ss tt ≥ ,  {, } {, } tt rr ω ω = , 
1, 2, , {( ) , () , } ti ti j K t TyTyτ = 12 {() , ( ) , } ii j Ty Ty K τ , {} t dd =  , {,  and {} .  }{ , tt CL C =      } L   { } t kk =
Hence in a stationary equilibrium, prices are constant, tax and debt policy is constant, and all 
per capita quantities are constant. In this paper we will mainly focus on one particular steady 
state where the capital labor ratio   satisfies the golden rule  k () fk nδ ′ = + . This equilibrium 
arises when the government objective is the maximization of steady state welfare. We will 
assume such a stationary equilibrium exists. It will be achievable as long as the government 
can control the capital stock, either through sophisticated tax instruments or through 
(unrestricted) debt policy. Under this assumption, we can derive the following steady state 
analogues to the previously derived relationships:
6 
(i)  ()
1 (1 ) 1 (1 );
1
s
Ln k k s dn
n
δ
− +− − = + −+
+
   
 (ii)  () (1 ) (1 ) ;
C
nk k f k
L
δ += −+ −  
 (iii)  12
1
() ( ) 0
11 1
ii j i j
ij K
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Before considering the optimal taxation problem solved by a government in a second-
best setting where ability is a private information of agents, in the next section we 
characterize the first best solution to a simplified version of our OLG model. This will allow 
us to highlight that, in order to implement the first best, the information on individual’s 
abilities is not enough. Only if the information on agents’ age is used too, the first best can be 
achieved. 
 
3. First Best 
We consider a simplified economy where in the first period of their lives everyone has the 
same productivity 1 θ . In the second period an agent remains at productivity  11 1 θ θ =




6 By the definition of the steady state, debt per worker is constant; hence debt grows at rate   but, since  = , 
this exactly equals the interest amount which needs to be paid on debt from the previous period. Thus, debt does 
not appear in the government budget constraint in the golden rule steady state.   9
probability  11 p  and with probability  12 p  his productivity is  12 θ > 11 θ . We also let  0 δ = , 
abstract from the retirement period, and assume that the policy maker can control the capital 
 in period t. As our objective function we take the expected utility of a young agent:  t K
[ ] 1 1 (, 11 11 11 12 12 ) ( , ) , ) , Uc pUc p β +    12 ( Uc +    
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where for any variable x we have denote by  x U  the derivative of U with respect to x. 
Under the assumption that both productivity and age are observable by the planner, the 
consumption and labor supply can be freely set at different levels for young low skilled and 
old low skilled. Under this informational assumption, the Lagrangian for the First Best 
optimization problem can be written as: 
[] () k 1 (, Uc 1 11 11 11 12 12
1
) ( , ) ( , ) ) / . pUc Uc k f nk C L 12 p ( 1
R
μ ⎡ ⎤ Λ= + + + + − − + ⎣ ⎦
          (6) 
                 
The first order condition with respect to   is:    k
 
[ ] /1 ' ( ) ( 1 ) kf k n ∂Λ ∂ + − + = 0 , μ =      (7) 
 
which yields the familiar golden rule result  '( ) f kn = . Interpreting  '( ) f k  within a market 
framework we would have  .  rn =
For the purpose of illustrating the importance of the information on age, it is here 
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Combining (9) and (10) we obtain 
11 12 / cc UU 1 = : the marginal utility of consumption should 
be equalized across all old agents. It also implies that 
12 11 12 11 ,, . cc cc MRS MRT =  










β == + ,                                                                     (11) 
 
and therefore 
11 1 11 1 , cc cc , MRS MRT =
1 1 11 1
.  Considering the first order conditions for hours of work 
we can also show that the hours of work are undistorted. This is done in Appendix A. 
However, if the policy maker cannot observe individuals’ age, or is prevented from using this 
information, the consumption and labor supply bundle offered to young agents cannot be 
freely differentiated from the one offered to old low-skilled agents. In Appendix A we show 
that if c  and  1 c = =     the no-distortion results cannot be obtained. Thus, to achieve the 
undistorted First Best information on age is necessary. 
We are now ready to get back to our more general OLG model and consider age-
dependency in various second-best settings.   
4. Income taxation: theory 
4.1 Age dependent optimal nonlinear income tax 
In this section we assume that the government knows the age of individuals, the skill 
distribution at each age, and the Markov probabilities relating these distributions. We consider 
a discrete adaptation of the Mirrlees (1971) optimum income taxation model. The government 
can observe pre-tax income  y wθ =   and   but neither  w θ  nor  . To pursue its redistributive 
goals the government has at its disposal a nonlinear labor income tax schedule at each age, 
 and  , and a proportional tax on capital income, 
 
1() i Ty 2() ij Ty K τ . Agents maximize expected 
utility based on the link between pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings implied by the tax 
schedules. Using the notation introduced on page 5, the government's problem can 
equivalently be stated as choosing the allocations { , } ii i I by∈ and{, subject to a set 
of self-selection constraints and a public budget constraint. The self-selection constraints 
require that each agent (weakly) prefers the bundles intended for him to those that are 
intended for some other agent. This is a necessary condition on the allocation for it to be 
implementable by tax schedules that are common to all agents. Rather than choosing a single 
income point as in a static Mirrlees problem, in the dynamic problem we think of agents 
choosing a strategy. A strategy specifies which income point an agent chooses in each period 
(, ) } ij ij i j I J by ∈×  11
of work and each state of the world (e.g. for each skill realization in the second period of life). 
Agents’ strategies are independent of each other and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Each 
strategy also implies (unique) savings decisions consistent with the chosen income points and 
the agent's first order conditions for savings.  
Formally, a strategy corresponding to agent   is a plan  i 12 (,)
ii i σ σσ =  where 1
i I σ ∈  is 
the reported type when young, and  2
i σ  is a function  2 :
i J IJ →× σ  specifying the income 
point chosen when middle aged for each second period skill realization  j J ∈ . The set of all 
strategies available to agent i is denoted  i Γ . Truth-telling implies that a young agent of 
ability type i chooses the income point (,  in the first period and the income point 
 in the second period if 
) i i by
(, ) ij ij by j  is his skill realization when middle aged. We denote the 




i σ σσ =       with  1
i i σ =    and  2
i() ( ,) j ij = σ   ,  j J ∀ ∈ . An agent choosing 
any other strategy is called a mimicker  or  deviating  agent.  An allocation is said to be 
incentive-compatible or satisfying the self-selection constraints if the agent (weakly) prefers 
to adopt his truthful strategy rather than any deviating strategy. It is clear that there are many 
possible deviations from the truthful strategy as a truthful agent must not only report his true 
ability in period 1 but also report truthfully his skill realization in period 2. The possibility to 
save/borrow doesn’t affect the number of incentive constraints but does enable agents to 
equalize, both for truthful- and mimicking strategies, the expected marginal utility of 
consumption when middle aged to the marginal utility of consumption when young. This 
makes deviating strategies more attractive as compared to a situation where agents cannot 
save, since in such a case the intertemporal allocation would be completely determined by the 
income points chosen when young and middle aged. Hence, with anonymous savings, income 
in any period is a weaker signal of ability and less redistribution can be achieved.  
As we have assumed a flat tax  K τ  on capital income, the intertemporal distortion will 
be the same both for truthful- and mimicking agents. A positive capital income tax might be 
desirable when mimickers tend to have a valuation of future consumption that is higher than 
that of non-deviating agents. 
It is clear that the set of truthful strategies is just a small subset of the set of possible 
strategies  . Assume for instance that each agent has the same number of different 




ϕ . With   
possible ability types when young, the number of bundles offered by the government on the 
y m  12
income tax schedule for the young is  . On the income tax schedule for the old, the efficient 








Ψ≡ = ∑ . Hence, the total number of 














To illustrate the formula above, suppose that  =  and that each type of young 
agents can be one of three possible types in the second period, meaning that  3 ϕ =
6 Ψ=
. This 
implies that the optimal number of bundles offered to the middle aged agents is  . In this 
case  864 Γ=  and only two of these strategies entail truthful revelation (one for each type in 
the first period). This calculation forms the basis for setting up the set of self-selection 
constraints in the age-dependent (hereafter, AD) nonlinear income taxation problem.
8 
Truthful revelation necessitates that choosing any of the 862 “mimicking” strategies should 
yield lower utility for the agent than choosing the truthful strategy associated with his type.  
                                                
We are now in a position to formally state the problem of the government. As an 
objective function we choose the maximin social welfare function, given that it will be the 




ii i 7 Proof: We have definedσ σσ =
i  with  1 I σ ∈ and  . Note that the number of functions 
from  to 
2 :
i JI J σ →×
J
IJ
ϕ J I J ×  is   ×= Ψ
i
 by the rule of cardinal exponentiation. Hence the number of strategies for 
each agent   is given by  12 {
i
1 2 2 {} {} } {} {} {}
i i i iy iy mm
ϕ σσ σσ σ σ =×= = = Ψ
y m
() i
and summing over all 
types when young (which are  in number) the formula is obtained. 
8 For the general case when each ability type when young has a specific number of possible skill realizations 
when middle aged, the formula for calculating the total number of strategies is the following. Suppose that there 
is a function  iI ϕ  that for every ability type  ∈  when young gives the corresponding number of possible 
ability types when middle aged. For instance,  () ij ϕ = would mean that, if an agent is of ability type   when 
young, his ability type when middle aged can take 
i
j different realizations. With 
y m  possible ability types when 










the income tax schedule for the middle aged, the efficient number of bundles offered by the government is 
. Hence, the total number of strategies, including the strategies entailing truthful revelation, is 
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with  i s
σ  denoting the savings chosen in the first period by a type i agent who adopts the 
strategy 
i σ  and   denoting the savings prescribed in the second period by this strategy if 
he turns out being of skill 
() i sj
σ
j  when middle aged (with   denoting the savings undertaken 
in the second period under a truthful reporting strategy). The (IC1) set of constraints ensures 
that every agent i  prefers the truthful strategy 
( ) i sj
I ∈
i σ    over any other available strategy. 
It is of interest to note that the optimal nonlinear AD tax achieves the golden rule 
capital-labor ratio even if debt policy is unavailable. We show this formally in Appendix B. 
This means that there is an indeterminacy in the above optimization problem in the sense that 
there is an infinite number of combinations of taxes and debt that all yield the same global 
optimum. The intuition for this result is that under an AD nonlinear tax the savings of the 
young does not matter for self-selection purposes. More precisely, under an AD nonlinear tax 
one can marginally change the after-tax labor incomes of the young, and at the same time 
adjust the after-tax labor incomes of the middle aged, in such a way that the lifetime tax 
payment of all agents is left unaffected, all young agents change their savings by the same   14
amount, the public budget is still balanced and all the self-selection constraints continue to be 
satisfied if they were satisfied before the implementation of the reform. In this sense one can 
claim that the absolute level of private savings does not matter for self-selection purposes; 
therefore, savings can be controlled (by a proper choice of the labor income taxes when young 
and when middle aged) with the sole purpose of achieving the golden rule capital stock. 
4.2 Age independent optimal nonlinear income tax 
Under an age-independent (hereafter, AID) nonlinear income tax the government’s problem 
changes only because the set of incentive constraints is larger. It is still the case that the 
number of income points on the schedule for the young is   and the one on the schedule for 
the middle aged is  . However, under a nonlinear AID tax it is possible for an agent to 
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The set of all strategies available to a young agent of type i is denoted by  
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This rule can be derived as follows. Consider an agent with a specific skill type when young. 
In the first period he can choose among (
y m +Ψ  different income points, and this explains 
the first factor in the expression above. For any given choice in the first period, a strategy 
must specify a point to be chosen for each possible skill realization in the second period; with 
ϕ  possible skill realizations there are ()
y m
ϕ Ψ+  ways to choose an income point in the 
second period. Taking into account that this reasoning applies to each of the m  possible 
types of young agents, the formula above is obtained.  
y
                                                 
y m
9 The formal proof is analogous to the proof given in footnote 7 for the AD case, taking into account that the 
number of points to choose from when young and middle aged is now  Ψ+ . For the general case when each 
ability type when young has a specific number of possible skill realizations when middle aged (meaning that ϕ  
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In contrast to the nonlinear AD tax, the nonlinear AID tax does in general not achieve 
the golden rule if debt policy is not available. This is shown in Appendix C. In the absence of 
debt policy, or when there are restrictions on debt policy, a conflict arises between controlling 
the capital stock and guaranteeing incentive-compatibility of the allocations intended for the 
various types of agents. The reason is that, under a nonlinear AID tax, it is not possible to 
change the after-tax labor incomes of the young, and at the same time adjust the after-tax 
labor incomes of the middle aged, in such a way that the lifetime tax payment of all agents is 
left unaffected, all young agents change their savings by the same amount, the public budget 
is balanced and all the self-selection constraints continue to be satisfied. In this sense we can 
claim that, under a nonlinear AID tax, the absolute level of savings matters for self-selection 
purposes (or, put differently, the level of individual savings becomes relevant in order to deter 
mimicking behaviors). Therefore, we can no longer select the after-tax labor incomes of the 
young and the middle aged with the sole purpose of attaining the golden rule. Hence, for the 
nonlinear AID tax, only if unrestricted debt policy can be used can the capital stock be 
controlled independently of the self-selection constraints.  
4.3 Linear income tax: age dependent and age independent 
An interesting question is how the gains from age dependency depend on the social planner's 
ability to fully optimize a nonlinear tax schedule; moreover, it is also of interest to compare 
the welfare gains descending from age-dependency with the welfare gains that can be 
obtained by moving from a linear labor income tax to a nonlinear tax. For this purposes, in 
this section we restrict   and  () 1 T i ( ) 2 T i  to be affine functions, so that labor income is taxed at 
the flat rates  1 τ  and  2 τ  in the first- and second-period respectively. In addition, there is a 
demogrant   which is paid to all young workers and a demogrant   which is paid to all 
middle aged workers. In the AID scenario we impose 
1 G 2 G
2 1 τ τ =  and  1 G 2 G = , whereas no such 
restriction is made in the AD setting. Both in the AID and the AD linear tax systems we 
restrict the demogrants to be positive (   i=1,2). The reason for imposing such a 
restriction is a concern for realism: a uniform lump-sum tax is very unlikely to be politically 
implementable.
0 i G ≥
10 For later purposes it is worth noticing that age-differentiated demogrants are 
redundant when the government has access to an unrestricted debt policy. In that case, the 
restriction that G  is harmless from the social welfare perspective.  12 G =
                                                 
10 The attempt made by Margaret Thatcher to introduce a poll tax in UK can be regarded as an example.   16
The tax rate on capital income is always denoted by  K τ . Combining the resource 
constraint and the private budget constraints, together with the definitions of   and  , and 
the capital market equilibrium condition, one can derive the following government’s budget 
constraint: 
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5. Calibration and computational approach 
5.1 Parameterization 
In the benchmark parameterization each period corresponds to 20 years. We use a 
parameterization similar to the one employed in Conesa et al. (2009). Annual depreciation is 
set to 8%, population growth to 1.1%. We then calculate the 20 year analogues of these 
numbers which yields   and  . We also assume  . 
Production is Cobb-Douglas and the share of capital in production is
20 (1.011) 1 n =−
20 10 . 9 2 δ =−
20 0.988 β =
1/3 α = . The production 
scale factor A is chosen so that the equilibrium rental price for one efficiency unit of labor is 
equal to one. Agents maximize their expected lifetime utility given an instantaneous utility 














We choose   (implying a Frisch elasticity of 0.8) and  2.25 κ = γ =0.9 as benchmark values. 
For sensitivity analysis we also consider  0.7 γ =  and  1.3 γ =  as well as   (implying a 
Frisch elasticity of 0.33) and   (implying a Frisch elasticity of 1).
4 κ =
2 κ =
                                                
11 The government’s 
exogenous revenue requirement is set to zero. 
 
11 There is substantial empirical uncertainty regarding the Frisch elasticity. Microeconometric evidence suggests 
a low value of around 0.1. However, other estimates (see for instance Imai and Keane (2004) and Keane (2009)) 
are as high as 4.   17
5.2 Wage Process 
In static optimal nonlinear tax analysis it is well known that the optimal tax schedule depends 
on the distribution of skills in the economy. In a dynamic setting the equivalent of the skill 
distribution is the skill process. The skill process is a more complex object which consists of 
three parts, the skill distributions in the first- and second periods, and the transition 
probabilities linking these distributions. It is worth noting that there are various combinations 
of transition probabilities and wage levels which result in the same expected lifetime income 
paths for all agents, but these different skill processes might yield different welfare gains 
when studying policy reforms. The welfare gains and the shape of an optimal AD tax will 
crucially depend on the skill process. There are primarily two features of the wage process 
which are important. The first is the degree of overlap of the wage distributions for the young 
and for the middle aged. The second is the persistence of the wage process, which captures 
how likely it is for an agent classified as low skilled in the first period to remain low skilled 
also in the second period. Both these aspects of the wage process are likely to differ between 
economies and therefore the welfare gains of AD taxes will be different for different 
countries. In this paper we calibrate our model economy to the skill processes of two actual 
economies, the US and Sweden. These economies are often regarded as two extremes in terms 
of wage dispersion and wage mobility. In addition to being informative regarding the welfare 
gains achievable in real economies, the two calibrations tell us something about the sensitivity 
of our results to the choice of the skill process.  
Since the number of self-selections constraints increases quickly in the number of 
types, especially for the nonlinear AID tax, for computational reasons we can only have a 
small number of types. We have chosen to allow for three skills in the first period and four in 
the second. To keep the model manageable we also restrict some of the transition probabilities 
by assuming   for 0 ij p = 1 ij −> . The dynamics of the skill process is illustrated in Figure 1 
below. 
Besides assessing the welfare gain of age-dependency, our simulations will also shed 
light on the welfare gains of using an optimal nonlinear tax instead of a linear one. Given the 
many suggestions for a “flat tax” this is also of large interest. We have performed experiments 
in a simple static model and found that the welfare gain of a nonlinear tax upon a linear tax is, 
up to a certain point, monotonically increasing in the number of types used to represent the 
skill distribution. This is likely to be due to the fact that the quality of a linear approximation 
of a nonlinear function diminishes when the number of data points increase (e.g. a line 
perfectly approximates two points but not three). Given that computational considerations   18
restrict us to consider few types, our results should therefore be interpreted as a lower bound 
for the power of the nonlinear tax schedules.
12 
 
Figure 1 (Skill Process)   
 
 
                                                  
5.2.1.  The United States 
In order to estimate the transition probabilities we have used the National Longitudinal Study 
of Youth (NLSY79) published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Agents who were 25 
years old during the period 1982-1988 were sorted into different wage bins and this was done 
also for these agents 20 years later in order to construct wage bins for the young and old.
13 By 
tracing the movements among the different wage bins, the transition probabilities are 
estimated; the Markov probabilities are given as the relative frequencies of each of the 
possible wage paths represented by movements in and out of the wage bins. By construction, 
the (ex-ante) probability of being any one of the three possible types when young is 1/3.
 14 
The wage bins for young and middle aged are constructed as follows. Young agents 
are divided into three groups separated by the 33
rd and 66
th percentile; middle aged agents are 
divided into four groups separated by the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentile. The wage of each 
group is represented by the mean wage in that group. This enables us to classify individuals as 
having one out of six possible wage paths.  
                                                 
12 We conjecture that the same is true for the welfare gain of age dependence which is a comparison between two 
nonlinear tax schedules. The reason is that our welfare gain of age dependence is defined as the difference 
between the welfare gain of a nonlinear AD tax in comparison with a linear tax benchmark and the welfare gain 
of a nonlinear AID tax in comparison with the same linear benchmark. If both these terms are magnified by the 
same factor in a less restrictive model, the welfare gains of age dependence in our model with a limited number 
of types should be regarded as a lower bound of the welfare gains achievable in a richer environment. 
13 The reason we have not focused on a single year is to smooth out potential year and cohort-specific shocks to 
individual wages. 
14 The final sample size is 6981. Individuals with an hourly wage rate of less than SEK 10 or greater than SEK 
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Although wage data is available in the NLSY79, to get a more accurate picture of the 
actual wage distribution in the US and for the purpose of obtaining the wage rates only, we 
have chosen to use extracts from the more representative Current Population Survey (CPS). 
We have constructed hourly wage rates for individuals who were 25 and 45 year old during 
the years 2004-2008. Focusing on males who were not self-employed and who earned more 
than an approximate federal minimum wage during the period, a measure of the wage rate 
was obtained by dividing earnings by hours worked. The wages in the CPS are top-coded 
(wages are truncated so that all earners above a threshold are assigned this threshold as their 
wage rate). We have dealt with this by assigning all agents subject to top-coding to a wage 
rate equal to the mean of the observations above the top-code. The mean is not known and has 
to be estimated. We have first estimated a Pareto distribution using the original data and then 
calculated the mean of this distribution above the top code.
15  The wage rates and the 
associated transition matrix for US are given in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 Hourly wages and transition matrix for the United States Economy 1984-1988 and 2004-2008 
   Middle aged    1  2  3  4 
Young Wages    10.319  16.079  22.624  44.813 
   Probabilities         
1 8.723    0.413  0.587  0  0 
2 13.02    0  0.531 0.469  0 
3 23.82    0  0  0.547 0.453 
(Wages in 2003 US Dollars) 
 
5.2.2. Sweden 
The wage process for Sweden is derived from a representative panel of the Swedish 
population (LINDA) which covers around 3 percent of the population each year. It is a 
combination of income tax registers, population censuses and other sources. We obtain the 
hourly wage by dividing the yearly income by an estimate of the total number of working 
hours for a full-time employee (currently 1880). To estimate the transition probabilities we 
follow the same general procedure as was used for the US data.  Thus, the wage distribution 
in the early period is divided into three wage bins and all men who were 25 years old during 
the period 1976-1980 are sorted into these bins. The same thing is done for the wage 
distribution of these same individuals 25 years later (when they are 50). At the later period the 
                                                 
15 We have adopted the procedure outlined in Schmitt (2003) which is applied to the CEPR extracts. The 
procedure of applying a Pareto distribution to top incomes in the context of top-coded earnings data has also 
been used by Saez and Veall (2003).   20
wage distribution is divided into four wage bins. The Markov probabilities are then given as 
the relative frequencies of each of the possible wage paths represented by movements in and 
out of the wage bins.
16 The wage rates and the associated transition matrix for Sweden are 
given in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2  (Wages and transition matrix for the Swedish Economy 1976-1980 and 2001-2005) 
 
   Middle aged    1  2  3  4 
Young Wages    8.792  14.930  18.536  25.922 
   Probabilities         
1 4.530    0.342  0.658  0  0 
2 12.195    0  0.514 0.486  0 
3 17.985    0  0  0.684 0.316 
(Wages expressed in US Dollars by taking wages expressed in 2003 Swedish Kronor and then converting them into US 
Dollars based on the average exchange rate over the period 2001-2005) 
 
 
There are a few points which we would like to emphasize. For the purpose of obtaining the 
transition probabilities we use data from two points in time. However, for both countries, the 
wages reported in table 1 and table 2 are taken from the most recent of the two sample 
periods. Given our assumptions, this is correct for two reasons.  First, if we were to use the 
earlier period for the wages of the young, and the more recent sample period for the middle 
aged, the wages for the latter would include wage changes (for instance productivity growth) 
occurring in the data, but not part of the model and which do not represent the evolution of 
skills that our skill process is meant to represent.
17 The second reason is that in the AID tax 
optimum the self-selection constraints are related to a tax schedule common to both young 
and old agents, and agents should properly be modeled as having the possibility only to mimic 
other agents alive in the same period. 
Comparing the wage processes in Table 1 and 2 we find that the wage distribution is 
more equal in the Swedish economy.
18 With respect to upward wage mobility we find that it 
is larger in Sweden in the lower part of the wage distribution, but that upward mobility for 
                                                 
16 The final sample size is 6981. Individuals with an hourly wage rate of less than SEK 10 or greater than SEK 
300 (in 1976 prices) were dropped from the sample. 
17 Recall that our model economy is assumed to be in a steady state which means that the wage distributions for 
young and old are assumed to be identical in the early and the late period. 
18 The estimated Gini coefficient for the US data is 0.267 for young agents, 0.329 for old agents and 0.327 for 
the combined population of young and old agents. For the Swedish data it is 0.196 for young agents, 0.268 for 
old agents and 0.262 for the combined population of 25 and 45 year old agents.     21
those with high wages as young is larger in the US. Thus, both the wage distributions and 
transition probabilities differ between the two economies. 
min
                                                
 
5.3  Computational approach 
The optimal tax problems in this paper are constrained nonlinear optimization problems and 
have been solved using sophisticated interior-point/barrier methods.
19 In cases where the 
problems are not entirely concave, the algorithms have been combined with global 
optimization heuristics initiating the solver from many different starting points with the 
ambition of finding all local optima, and selecting the one which results in the highest 
objective function value (all variables subject to optimization were properly normalized to 
ensure the efficiency of this procedure). The main computational difficulty lies in the 
structure of (and the number of) self-selection constraints. In some cases these difficulties 
were resolved by solving a sub-problem with a reduced number of constraints, and checking 
whether the optimal solution to the sub-problem is feasible with the full number of 
constraints. Care has also been taken to check the Lagrange multipliers for the possible failure 
of constraint qualifications (see Judd and Su (2006)). 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Social welfare function and welfare gains measure 
In most numerical optimal tax studies in the Mirrlees tradition, the government maximizes a 
concave transformation  of the vector of individual utilities U . However, it is the 
combined curvature of W and   which determines the preference for redistribution, hence 
changing preference parameters (through its effect on the concavity of U ) does not only have 
the intended effect on behavior but at the same time changes the redistributive taste of the 
government. To avoid confounding the curvature of W and  , and in order to obtain the 
cleanest measure of the welfare gain of policy reform, we adopt the maximin social welfare 
function, widely applied in the theoretical optimal taxation literature. Thus,  , 




min () WU U =
To calculate a consumption-based measure of the welfare gains attainable by more 
sophisticated tax schemes, we consider an equivalent-variation-type of welfare gain measure, 
 
19 The problem was set up in the modeling language AMPL and then solved using the nonlinear optimization 
solver KNITRO by Ziena Optimization Inc.   22
taking as a benchmark the solution to the government’s problem under an AID linear income 
tax with unrestricted debt policy. To obtain the welfare gain measure, we proceed as follows. 
We look for the minimum amount of extra revenue that should be injected, in the optimal AID 
linear taxation problem (with unrestricted debt policy), into the government's budget in order 
to achieve the same social welfare level as under a more sophisticated tax system. Once we 
have found this minimum amount of extra revenue, we divide it by the aggregate GDP at the 
AID linear pure tax optimum (with unrestricted public debt policy) in order to get a revenue-
based measure of the welfare gains. 
6.2. Welfare gains: an overview 
In this sub-section we provide an overview of the welfare gains obtained by an AD tax. We 
do this for the benchmark parametrization of the utility function. We present results both 
when debt policy is unrestricted and when public debt is restricted to be non-negative (or, 
equivalently, when per capita debt is restricted to be zero, given that the optimal unrestricted 
per capita debt would be negative). The results are summarized in tables 3 and 4 below. 
 
Table 3 Welfare gains (as percentage of GDP) for US 
 
Tax system  Welfare gain 
Linear AID Benchmark  - 
Linear AID, Zero Debt  -2.54% 
Linear AD, Zero Debt  ≈-0.01% 
Linear AD 
AD improves by 
2.54% due to 
slackening of IC + 
effect on capital 
accumulation 
≈0.01% 
Nonlinear AID, Zero Debt  6.34% 
Nonlinear AID  6.91% 
Nonlinear AD  8.88% 
AD improves by 
1.97% due to 
slackening of IC  
 
 
We start by commenting on the results for the US economy. The perhaps most striking result 
in table 3 is the large welfare gain obtained when moving from a linear- to a nonlinear income 
tax. Comparing the linear AID with the nonlinear AID, both without restrictions on debt 
policy, the welfare gain amounts to about 6.9% of GDP. Comparing the linear AID with the 
nonlinear AID, both considered under the zero debt restriction, the welfare gain is almost 9%, 
and the same welfare gain is obtained comparing the linear AD with the nonlinear AD.   23
Let’s now focus on the welfare gains from age-dependency. For the linear tax the 
gains are virtually zero if the policy maker can freely use debt policy, so that the golden rule 
can be achieved. If the policy maker is restricted in the use of public debt, the welfare gain of 
moving from the AID to the AD is about 2.5% of GDP. The reason is that the AD tax almost 
achieves the Golden Rule whereas the AID does not. The reason why the AD does not fully 
achieve the golden rule is that we have imposed a restriction that the demogrants must be 
nonnegative.  
The AD nonlinear tax achieves the golden rule even if public debt cannot be used. 
This means that the gains of moving from a nonlinear AID tax to the nonlinear AD are of two 
kinds. One is due to the fact that the golden rule can always be achieved under the AD; 
another is that the AD tax mitigates the self-selection constraints. The total gain in moving 
from the nonlinear AID with a zero debt restriction to the nonlinear AD amounts to 2.54% of 
GDP (8.88%-6.34%). This total gain can be decomposed into one part due to the power of the 
AD to achieve the golden rule even without public debt; this part amounts to 0.57% of GDP 
(6.91%-6.34%). The other part is due to the fact that the AD mitigates some of the self-
selection constraints; this part amounts to 1.97% of GDP (8.88%-6.91%).  
In table 4 we show the corresponding welfare gains obtained for the Swedish 
economy. It should be noted that the only difference between our representations of the US 
and Swedish economies refers to the wage processes. All other aspects of the economies are 
the same. Hence, the difference in results between table 3 and table 4 depends entirely on the 
difference in the wage processes. The gains of moving from a linear- to a nonlinear tax are of 
the same magnitude as for the US economy, i.e. around 7-9% of GDP. The gains of moving 
from a nonlinear AID with a zero debt restriction to a nonlinear AD is around 3.34%, i.e. 
about 0.8 percentage points higher than for US. A gain of about 1.78% of GDP is due to the 
power of the AD to achieve the Golden Rule and a gain of about 1.56% is due to the power to 
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Table 4 Welfare gains (as percentage of GDP) for Sweden 
 
Tax system  Welfare gain 
Linear AID Benchmark  - 
Linear AID, Zero Debt  -3.30% 
Linear AD, Zero Debt  0.19% 
Linear AD  0.57% 
Nonlinear AID, Zero Debt  5.98% 
Nonlinear AID  7.76% 
Nonlinear AD  9.32% 
AD improves by 
3.34% due to 
slackening of IC + 
effect on capital 
accumulation 
AD improves by 
1.56% due to 
slackening of IC  
 
     
After having given an overview of the welfare gains we move on to describe the 
characteristics of the optimal tax systems. 
6.3  US: Nonlinear taxation with unrestricted debt policy 
Table 5 below presents the most relevant characteristics of the optimal nonlinear AD and the 
optimal nonlinear AID labor income tax. The values for the AID scenario are calculated under 
the assumption that the government is unrestricted in its debt policy. Since the AD tax 
achieves the golden rule even when public debt is zero, the AD tax is computed under the 
assumption that public debt is zero. We can see that, as compared with the results for the 
nonlinear AID setting, the AD labor income tax entails a shift of the tax burden on labor 
income from the young- to the middle-aged-workers: all the average labor income tax rates on 
young workers are lowered whereas all the average labor income tax rates on middle-aged- 
workers are increased. 
With respect to the effects on labor supply, we find that all young workers, with the 
exception of the least skilled agents, increase their labor supply when moving from the AID to 
the nonlinear AD tax. For the middle-aged-workers, we find that all agents, with the exception 
of the group with the second highest wages, increase their labor supply when moving from the 
AID to the nonlinear AD tax. The labor supply pattern is also reflected in how the marginal 
tax rates on the labor income vary when moving to an AD tax.
20 Among the young, the 
                                                 
 
20 As is common practice in the optimal taxation literature, the marginal income tax rates are calculated using the 
first order conditions characterizing the agents’ behavior. More precisely, since an optimizing agent equalizes 
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between pre-tax labor income and consumption to one minus the 
marginal tax rate on labor income, it is possible to express the marginal labor income tax rate implicitly faced by 
an agent at the equilibrium allocation as 1-MRS. It should be noticed that the implicit marginal tax rate on labor   25
marginal tax rate on labor income is raised for the least skilled workers, whereas it declines 
for the other types of young workers. Among the middle aged, the marginal tax rate on labor 
income increases for the group with the second highest wages, and declines for all the 
remaining types of middle-aged-workers. 
The shift from a nonlinear AID to a nonlinear AD tax entails for US a more generalized 
reduction in the optimal marginal tax rates than what we find for Sweden (see table 10 
below). This appears consistent with the welfare gain results displayed in tables 3 and 4. 
There, we have seen that the welfare gain of the shift is larger for Sweden when we consider 
the “full” welfare gain, that takes into account both the gains descending from incentive-
compatibility effects and those descending from capital accumulation effects. However, we 
have also seen that in the case of US the component related to incentive-compatibility effects 
explains more than 3/4 of the “full” welfare gain, whereas for Sweden the corresponding 
fraction is about 1/2. Because of that, the magnitude of the welfare gain is larger for US when 
we restrict attention to the role of an AD tax as an instrument to slacken binding self-selection 
constraints (1.97% for US as compared to 1.56% for Sweden). Since high marginal income 
tax rates signal the need to distort agents’ behavior in order to prevent mimicking (or, 
equivalently, in order to attain incentive-compatibility), slackening the self-selection 
constraints allows the government to lower the distortions required to ensure incentive-
compatibility. Taking into account that the stronger the effect on the self-selection constraints 
and the larger the reduction in the marginal income tax rates that the government can afford, 
we can rationalize why the adoption of a nonlinear AD tax brings about in US a more 











income depends not only on the (y,b)-bundle under consideration but also on the savings behavior of agents. This 
is because the marginal utility of consumption depends both on the after-tax labor income and on the level of 
savings.        26
Table 5  US  Nonlinear Taxation,  Benchmark case 
 
Age Dependent Tax  Welfare Gain = 8.88%  Capital Tax = 49.19% 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () EU   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   6.301  0.621  59.78% 
(1,2) 
30.175 4.278  -18.134  55.79% 
15.061 6.626  49.64% 
(2,2) 15.061  6.626  49.74% 
(2,3) 
30.355 8.815  -15.120  50.58% 
22.447 11.214  56.81% 
(3,3) 22.447  11.214  51.05% 
(3,4) 
30.792 30.004  -3.274  17.38% 
65.302 40.606  41.93% 
Age Independent Tax  Welfare Gain = 6.91%  Capital Tax = 4.63%,  Debt = -6.038 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () E U   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   5.239  -8.362  68.19% 
(1,2) 
30.079 5.239  -8.363  49.36% 
11.625 -3.910  65.05% 
(2,2) 11.625  -3.910  65.99% 
(2,3) 
30.280 8.454  -6.173  57.92% 
26.206 5.045  44.74% 
(3,3)         26.206  5.045  41.51% 
(3,4) 
30.748 26.206  5.045  38.55% 
63.281 31.000  47.77% 
 
 
A somewhat unexpected feature of the results displayed in table 5 is the partial 
pooling that occurs among the middle-aged-workers. When calculating the solution to the 
government’s problems, we did not impose any restriction requiring that the same (y,b)-
bundle should be offered to all middle-aged-workers of a given ability type, irrespective of 
their ability type when young.
21 This restriction would be natural in a model that doesn’t 
allow people to save, because then the slope of the indifference curves in the (y,b)-space of a 
middle-aged-worker would only depend on his current wage rate and not on his wage rate 
(ability type) when young. However, when people are allowed to freely save/borrow, the 
slope of the indifference curves in the (y,b)-space of a middle-aged-worker depend in general 
both on his current wage rate and on his past wage rate. This means that it is in principle 
possible for the government to separate the middle-aged-workers of a given ability type 
depending on their type when young. This possibility notwithstanding, pooling is obtained at 
an optimum both under a nonlinear AID and under a nonlinear AD tax. 
                                                 
21 Formally, we didn’t impose the restriction ( ) ( ) ,, ij ij kj kj y by b = .   27
The column headed   in table 5 shows the expected utility of the various agents. 
We see that, even though our welfare criterion maximizes the expected utility for the young 
type with lowest expected utility, it is still the case that for all types the nonlinear AD tax 
gives a higher expected utility than the nonlinear AID tax.   
( ) EU
For computational reasons we had to restrict ourselves to three types in the first period 
and four types in the second period. However, exploiting the fact that there are fewer self-
selection constraints for the AD tax, we can make calculations for the AD tax also for a four 
by five case. Although for this more general case we cannot calculate the welfare gains of 
age-dependency because we do not calculate the AID optimum, the four by five case allows 
us to provide a more detailed characterization of the AD tax. As for the three by four case we 
have maintained the restriction on transition probabilities. We graphically illustrate the tax 
regime below. Figure 2 shows how the marginal tax rate varies with income for the young and 
the middle aged. The young consistently face a lower marginal tax than the middle aged. For 
static optimal tax models there are two typical profiles for the marginal tax rates. One is a U-
shaped profile, which we obtain for the middle-aged-workers. The other is a continuously 
declining profile, which is the one that we obtain for the young workers.    
 
Figure 2.  Marginal tax rates for young and middle aged, extended model 
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Young











In figure 3 we show how the tax varies with income, with the middle-aged-workers 
paying much higher taxes than the young. This is of course to drive savings to a level   28
compatible with the golden rule. (For an AD tax under a regime with unrestricted public debt 







Figure 3.  Tax functions for young and middle aged, extended model 
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6.4  US: Nonlinear taxation with restrictions on debt policy 
In the simulations for the AID tax under no restriction on debt policy, we find that public debt 
should be negative. That is, the government should be a net lender to individuals. This is not a 
phenomenon we observe in actual economies. Rather, in most economies the public sector 
borrows from the private sector and the stock of public debt is sometimes quite high. We 
therefore believe it is of interest to study the case where we impose the restriction that public 
debt must be non-negative. In table 6 we show simulation results obtained for the nonlinear 
AID tax under this restriction. The nonlinear AID tax cannot achieve the golden rule in this 
case; what is obtained is a steady state where the capital/labor ratio is lower than the one 
prescribed by the golden rule.  
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Table 6 US Nonlinear Age Independent Tax, Benchmark case with zero debt restriction 
 
Age Independent Tax (d=0)  Welfare Gain = 6.34%  Capital Tax = 65.4% 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () EU   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   4.401  -9.052  62.73% 
(1,2) 
30.050 4.401  -9.052  40.72% 
9.643 -5.709  59.72% 
(2,2) 9.643  -5.709  60.66% 
(2,3) 
30.250 7.299  -7.261  48.90% 
21.958 1.090  35.43% 
(3,3) 21.958  1.090  31.90% 
(3,4) 
30.715 21.958  1.090  28.43% 




Comparing these results with those obtained for the AID tax with unrestricted debt we see a 
dramatic increase in the tax on capital income, which increases from 4.6% to 65.4%. We 
provide comments on this in section 6.8 below.  
 
 
6.5 US: Sensitivity analysis 
In this sub-section we perform some sensitivity analysis. We begin by considering alternative 
values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the Frisch elasticity. More precisely, we 
consider how the welfare gains change when  0.7 γ =  or  1.3 γ = , and when   or  2 κ = 4 κ = . 
The results are presented in table 7 where we compare the nonlinear AID tax with unrestricted 
debt policy to the nonlinear AD tax (thus, we are only capturing the welfare gains due to 
alleviation of incentive constraints). From this table we see that the welfare gains are 
increasing in γ  and decreasing in κ ; equivalently, the welfare gains are increasing in the 
value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and of the Frisch elasticity.





                                                 
22 Given that these welfare gain comparisons have been based on the assumption that the government faces no 
restriction on debt policy, they only reflect the welfare gain component ascribable to the beneficial effect on the 




Table 7 Welfare Gains Nonlinear Taxation – Sensitivity Analysis 
   
 
Variation in γ  
0.7; 2.25 γ κ ==
 
AD  =  8.72% 
AID =  6.81% 
Diff = 1.91% 
0.9; 2.25 γ κ = =
 
AD  = 8.88% 
AID = 6.91% 
Diff = 1.97% 
1.3; 2.25 γ κ = =  
 
AD = 9.02% 
AID= 6.75% 
Diff = 2.27% 
 
 
Variation in    κ
0.9; 2.00 γ κ ==
 
AD  = 8.30% 
AID = 6.06% 
Diff =  2.24% 
0.9; 2.25 γ κ = =
 
AD  = 8.88% 
AID = 6.91% 
Diff =  1.97% 
0.9; 4.00 γ κ = =  
 
AD  = 9.21% 
AID = 8.04% 















To assess the sensitivity of results with respect to the wage process, we have also performed 
some experiments with changes in the transition probabilities. In particular, we have assumed 
a “high persistency” (or “low uncertainty”) scenario where for all young agents the 
probability of maintaining the same skill rank when middle aged is equal to 0.98, whereas the 
probability to move upwards is equal to 0.02. To save space we summarize here the main 
results without providing tables. 
For the US benchmark parameterization case, the welfare gain of a nonlinear AD tax 
is equal to 9.43% (as compared to the benchmark linear AID tax with unrestricted debt 
policy), whereas for the nonlinear AID it is equal to 7.43%. Thus, both welfare gains becomes 
larger than under the “correct” transition probabilities, but the welfare gain of moving from a 
nonlinear AID to an AD tax is virtually unaffected (since it is 2% and it was 1.97%). 
Interestingly, we also find that type (1,2) and type (2,2) are no longer pooled together 
in the nonlinear AID case. Doing the same experiment but with the parameterization γ =1.3 
and  =2.25 we were able to eliminate all pooling under the nonlinear AD tax, whereas for 
the nonlinear AID tax pooling was eliminated only for types (1,2) and (2,2). The welfare gain 
of a nonlinear AD tax becomes in this case 9.3% and 7.26% is the welfare gain of a nonlinear 
AID tax. Thus, the welfare gains become larger (and the difference is more substantial than in 
the benchmark parametrization scenario) also in this case. However, the welfare differential 
between the nonlinear AD tax and the nonlinear AID tax  becomes 2.04% as compared to 
2.27% that is obtained with the “correct” transition probabilities. Thus, the welfare gain of 
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switching from a nonlinear AID to an AD tax appears to become smaller with “high 
persistency” only when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is fairly large. 
Finally, when the government is empowered with nonlinear income taxes, the capital 
tax rate remains substantially different from zero even under “high persistency” in the 
transition probabilities.  
 
 
6.6  US  Linear taxation 
 
In this sub-section we present the simulation results for the case when age-dependency is 
nested upon a linear taxation system. In table 8 we present the results for the different linear 
tax optima. In the presence of unrestricted debt policy linear AD taxes offer only a modest 
welfare gain as compared to the benchmark economy. However, when there are restrictions 
on debt policy, the possibility of having AD demogrants offers a significant advantage as it 
allows the linear AD tax to partially replicate the intergenerational transfer implicit in the 
optimum with the more powerful unrestricted debt instrument. This shows that the advantage 
of AD taxes is not limited to situations where sophisticated nonlinear tax instruments are 
available. A compelling argument for AD taxes exists also in linear taxation framework. 
If, for any given assumption about the availability of debt policy, we compare the 
values for the AD scenario with those for the AID scenario, we can see that age-dependency 
entails an increase in the degree of progressivity of the labor income tax schedule faced by 
young workers and a reduction in the degree of progressivity of the labor income tax schedule 
faced by middle-aged-workers. Under the non-negativity of debt restriction, we can even see 
that the optimal AD labor income tax on middle-aged-workers is proportional, rather than 
linear. Here it is our restriction that demogrants cannot be negative that is binding. Removing 
this restriction would generate a regressive labor income tax schedule on middle-aged-
workers.  
In table 8 we also present results for alternative values of the utility function 
parameters. We can see that the optimal capital tax rate is increasing in the value of the 
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Table 8  US Linear Tax System 
Optimum Parameterization  K τ   1 τ   2 τ   1 G   2 G   d   WF R  
0.7 γ =  ,  4 κ =   4.43% 64.77%  64.77%  12.232  12.232  -6.555  - 
Benchmark 10.84%  54.13%  54.13%  9.269  9.269  -6.443  - 
with d=0  66.04% 47.58% 47.58% 8.726 8.726  -  -2.55% 
AID 
1.3 γ = , 2 κ =   17.84% 54.56% 54.56% 5.908 5.908  -3.977  - 
0.7 γ = , 4 κ =   2.16% 65.94%  63.90%  12.204  12.204  -6.667  0.007% 
 Benchmark  7.25%  55.20%  53.54%  9.238  9.238  -6.540   0.006% 
with d=0  15.58% 54.68% 53.21%  16.787  0  -  -0.009% 
AD 
1.3 γ = , 2 κ =   13.17% 55.51% 54.11% 5.883 5.883  -4.047 0.004% 
 
6.7 Sweden: Nonlinear taxation with and without restrictions on debt policy 
Table 9 below presents the most relevant characteristics of the optimal nonlinear AD and the 
optimal nonlinear AID labor income tax for the Swedish economy. Although the results are 
not the same as for US, by and large the results are qualitatively similar.  
 
Table 9 Sweden  Nonlinear Taxation,  Benchmark case 
 
Age Dependent Tax  Welfare Gain = 9.32%  Capital Tax = 49.5% 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () EU   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   4.816  1.574  69.52% 
(1,2) 
29.429 1.181  -16.667  68.24% 
18.370 10.443  34.02% 
(2,2) 18.370  10.443  33.38% 
(2,3) 
29.613 9.587  -10.537  44.08% 
22.573 12.149  40.15% 
(3,3) 22.573  12.149  30.63% 
(3,4) 
30.017 23.096  -4.467  7.46% 
35.393 18.271  28.11% 
Age Independent Tax  Welfare Gain = 7.76%  Capital Tax = 61.4%,  Debt = -6.631 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () E U   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   5.113  -5.908  69.35% 
(1,2) 
29.356 1.232  -9.134  65.72% 
20.304 2.799  21.70% 
(2,2) 20.304  2.799  24.19% 
(2,3) 
29.607 7.766  -4.166  56.09% 
23.697 4.084  37.31% 
(3,3)   23.697  4.084  29.78% 
(3,4) 
29.968 20.304  2.799  24.84% 
31.939 8.634  44.86% 
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In table 10 we present the results obtained for the Swedish wage process when public debt is 
restricted to be non-negative. Once again, the results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained for the US economy.  
 
Table  10 Sweden Nonlinear Age Independent Tax, Benchmark case with zero debt restriction 
 
Age Independent Tax (d=0)  Welfare Gain = 5.98%  Capital Tax = 88.9% 
  Young Middle  aged 
Type  () EU   i y  () i Ty  '( ) i Ty  ij y   () ij Ty   '( ) ij Ty 
(1,1)   3.712  -6.853  64.34% 
(1,2) 
29.269 0.955  -9.052  57.44% 
15.318 -1.341  5.47% 
(2,2) 15.318  -1.341  8.48% 
(2,3) 
29.517 6.229  -7.261  42.50% 
18.803 -0.578  16.67% 
(3,3) 18.803  -0.578  8.20% 
(3,4) 
29.887 15.318  -1.090  9.09% 
24.418 1.836  32.20% 
  
6.8  Sweden: Linear taxation 
In table 11 we present results for the Swedish wage process under the assumption that a linear 
tax system is adopted. Here also the results are similar to those obtained for the US economy. 
However, one difference concerns the size of the optimal capital income tax rate which is 
considerably higher for Sweden than for the US when an AID tax with unrestricted debt 
policy is considered.  
 
Table 11 Sweden Linear Tax System, Benchmark case 
 
Optimum Debt  K τ   1 τ   2 τ   1 G 2 G d WF       R  
Yes 42.53%  50.70%  50.70%  6.998  6.998  -5.696  - 
AID 
No 77.46%  43.34%  43.34%  6.520  6.520 -  -3.30% 
Yes 3.57%  60.80%  43.24%  6.563  6.563  -6.552  0.57% 
AD 
No 41.55%  58.14%  41.31%  11.978 0  -  0.19% 
 
Having completed the presentation of our numerical results, in the next sub-section we 
provide some further comments on the results that we have obtained with respect to the 
optimal level of the capital income tax rate.  
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6.9  Capital income taxation 
There is a long standing interest in the question of whether there should be a positive tax on 
capital income. Our simulations shed light on this issue. We consider several different 
specifications of our model and in all specifications we obtain a positive tax on interest 
income.
23 However, the numerical magnitude varies quite a lot: from 4.6% for the US 
nonlinear AID tax under unrestricted debt policy up to 88.9% for the Swedish nonlinear AID 
tax with public debt restricted to be non-negative. There are basically two different 
mechanisms that in our model generate the result that there should be a positive interest 
income tax. One is that such a tax helps to mitigate self-selection constraints, another is that it 
can help capital accumulation and move the economy closer to the golden rule.   
The first mechanism is best illustrated by the tax systems (economies) where the set of 
policy instrument is so rich that the golden rule capital/labor ratio is obtained without any help 
from interest income taxation. These are the nonlinear AID tax under unrestricted public debt 
and the nonlinear AD tax systems. For these tax systems a non-zero tax on interest income 
occurs only if it mitigates self-selection constraints. The Atkinson-Stiglitz result of a zero 
commodity tax really requires both that labor is weakly separable from commodities in the 
utility function and  that labor is weakly separable from commodities in the individuals’ 
budget constraints (this latter requirement has received too little emphasis in the literature). In 
our model labor is weakly separable from commodities in the utility function. However, since 
the wage process is such that the second period wage rate is uncertain for the individual, the 
budget constraint becomes non-separable. The standard result from the optimal commodity 
tax literature becomes applicable. One should tax more heavily the commodities for which the 
mimicker’s consumption is higher than the consumption of the mimicked’s. Hence, a positive 
capital income tax rate becomes desirable if, at the binding self-selection constraints to the 
government’s problem, the savings of the mimickers tend to exceed the savings of the agents 
being mimicked. The exact formula for the optimal interest tax rate in our model is given in 
Appendix D. From the simulations we see that the optimal value of the capital income tax rate 
jumps around quite a lot. However, this is hardly surprising given that  K τ  depends solely on 
the difference between the amount of savings of a mimicker, and that of the agent being 
mimicked, at the various self-selection constraints that are binding at the solution to the 
                                                 
23 This is in line with many recent studies like, for example, Conesa et al. (2009) who find that the tax on capital 
income should be around 30%. Early studies, like Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), using a model with a 
representative consumer with infinite life, obtained the result that the tax on capital income should be zero.    35
government’s problem. Since a change in the wage process or a switch from a nonlinear AID 
labor income tax to a nonlinear AD labor income tax is likely to bring about significant 
changes in the set of self-selection constraints that are binding at an optimum, one should not 
expect to find any clear pattern in how the optimal value for  K τ  is affected.
24 
Let’s now consider the second mechanism that can explain the desirability of 
distorting the agents’ intertemporal consumption choices. That a tax/subsidy on interest 
income can help capital accumulation is perhaps best illustrated in the linear tax model with 
zero debt. For an AD tax with no restrictions on the demogrants, savings, and hence the 
capital stock, can be perfectly controlled by setting the demogrants in the proper way. For the 
linear AID tax the demogrant must be the same in both periods. However, a tax on interest 
income can serve as an imperfect substitute for AD demogrants. As our model is set up, 
individuals save when young and pay tax on interest income in subsequent periods. Increasing 
the tax on interest income and using the proceeds to increase the demogrant implies a 
redistribution of resources to the young, hence it will induce increased savings. Of course, an 
increase in the tax on interest income will distort the relative price between consumption in 
different periods, which limits the extent to which one would like to use this mechanism to 
increase the steady state capital stock. The large increase in the interest tax rate from 10.8% to 
66% that obtains for the US linear AID tax as we impose a zero debt restriction can best be 
understood as a way to increase individual savings and hence the capital stock. For the 
Swedish economy we get an increase from 42.5% to 77.5% as the zero debt restriction is 
imposed for the linear AID tax.    
For the nonlinear AID tax under a zero debt restriction there can be a non-zero tax on 
interest income both because such a tax can mitigate self-selection constraints, and because it 
can help capital accumulation. For the US, we see that when the zero debt restriction is 
imposed, the interest tax rate increases from 4,6% to 65.4% under an optimal nonlinear AID 
labor income tax. However, it is not clear that one should attribute all of this increase to the 
capital accumulation mechanism as the set of self-selection constraints also will change as we 
introduce the zero debt condition.    
We have seen that the size of the optimal tax on interest income varies to a very large 
extent as the specification of the model varies.  An implication of this is that we should not 
expect to be able to set the tax on interest income at the correct (optimal) level in real 
                                                 
24 This point is further investigated in Appendix D where we provide an analytical expression for the condition 
characterizing the optimal level of the interest income tax rate.   36
economies. However, this does not necessarily imply large welfare losses. For the US 
economy we have done simulations looking at how the welfare gains (with respect to the 
benchmark linear AID tax scenario) are reduced when we deprive the government of the 
capital tax instrument. Compared to the welfare gains of having a nonlinear instead of linear 
income tax or an AID instead of an AD tax, the gains of setting the tax on interest income at 
the optimal level are in most cases of second order importance; setting  K τ =0 we find that the 
welfare gain of a nonlinear AD tax is lowered from 8.88% to 8.60% and the welfare gain of a 
nonlinear AID tax is lowered from 6.91% to 6.89%.
25 Of a similar order of magnitude are the 
reductions in the welfare gain values when linear income taxation schemes are considered. 
However, there is one exception to this pattern of results. For the US nonlinear AID tax under 
a zero debt restriction the welfare loss of restricting the capital tax rate to zero amounts to 
about 3%.            
 
8. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we have quantitatively assessed the welfare gains of an age-dependent tax. Our 
vehicle of analysis has been an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents, 
facing uncertainty regarding their future earnings capacities, and choosing labor supply and 
consumption optimally over their lifetime. For computational reasons we have not considered 
transitional dynamics but have focused on steady states. We have calibrated our model and 
estimated transitional wage paths using detailed wage data for both US and Sweden.  
Our calculations show that the welfare gains from age-dependent taxes are substantial, 
especially when there are restrictions on the use of debt policy so that the tax instruments play 
a role in achieving the optimal level of capital accumulation. For US, under our benchmark 
specification of the utility function, the welfare gain of switching from an optimal nonlinear 
age-independent income tax to an optimal nonlinear age-dependent income tax is about 2.5% 
of total output. This gain can be decomposed into incentive effects arising from alleviating 
self-selection constraints (which account for 2%) and capital accumulation effects (which 
account for 0.5%). The results for the Swedish wage process are similar. Here the total 
welfare gain is around 3.5%. Slightly more than half of this stems from a slackening of self-
selection constraints and slightly less than half from capital accumulation effects. Sensitivity 
analysis shows that the welfare gains of switching to a nonlinear age-dependent income tax 
are increasing in the coefficient of relative risk-aversion and in the value of the Frisch 
                                                 
25 The results are similar in magnitude for Sweden.   37
elasticity. The optimal age-dependent tax is characterized by a shift of tax burden from young 
to middle-aged-workers, and the optimum features a declining profile of marginal tax rates for 
young workers and a U-shaped profile for middle-aged workers. Age-dependency allows in 
particular the government to lower the marginal tax rate for young high income earners.  
It can be of interest to put the welfare gains obtained from moving to an age-
dependent tax into perspective. Although sizable, the most powerful reform is the switch from 
linear to nonlinear taxation. In light of recent flat tax proposals, our model suggests  that the 
implied welfare loss of  replacing an optimal nonlinear income with a linear tax can be as 
large as 7-9% of total output. This result holds for several alternative specifications of the 
model and for both the US and Swedish wage processes. Another issue which has attracted 
considerable interest is the taxation of interest income, which has typically been the focus of 
intertemporal models of optimal taxes. In our simulations the optimal tax rate on interest 
income exhibits substantial variability across different specifications, ranging from a 
minimum of 4.6% to a maximum of 88.9%. An implication is that we should not expect to be 
able to set the tax on interest income at the correct (optimal) level in real economies. 
However, this does not necessarily imply large welfare losses. For the US economy our 
simulations show, at least when the government is unrestricted in its debt policy, that the 
welfare contribution of choosing optimally the level of the capital tax rate is of second order 
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Appendix A.  Information on age is needed to achieve First Best 
 
Full information First Best.  
 
If there is information on each individual’s productivity and age, the policy maker can assign 
values for  , ,  . Rewrite the Lagrangian in an equivalent way as:  11 , c   11 11 , c   12 12 , c  
[ ] () ( ) 1 1 11 11 11 12 12 12 (, ) ( , ) ( , ) ( 1 ) . Uc pUc pUc k f k nkL C βλ ⎡ ⎤ Λ= + + + + − + − ⎣ ⎦
          
 
 The first order conditions with respect to  ,   and   are respectively:  1   11   12  
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Noticing that  () f kn k w −=  is (under the golden rule condition rn = ) the marginal product 
in efficiency unit of labor which, in a perfectly competitive factor market, would be equal to 
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That is, hours of work are undistorted. 
 
Restricted First Best: No information on age. 
 
We now assume that the policy maker has information on individuals’ productivities but not 
on their age. We keep the assumption that the capital stock can be controlled. However, since 
age is not observed, consumption and labor for young and old low-skilled must be the same, 
i.e.   and  . The Lagrangian now becomes:   11 cc = 1 1 11 =   
() 11 1 1 11 1 21 2
1
(,) (,) ( , ) ( 1 ) / .
h Uc pUc Uc k f k nk C L
R
πμ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ Λ= + + + + − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
          
 
We still have the golden rule result:  
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The two equations above imply: 
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Since   and   it follows that   11 cc = 1 1 c 11 =   
11 1 c UU =  and 
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Had we studied the F.O.C. for hours of work we would have found that hours of work also are 
distorted.  
 
Appendix B. The nonlinear AD tax always achieves the golden rule. 
In the absence of debt policy, the aggregate production constraint can be written as: 
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Substituting the equation above into the steady-state version of the aggregate production 
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  , we finally obtain the following steady-state version of the 
aggregate production constraint: 
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In the absence of debt policy we can therefore state the government’s problem under a 
nonlinear age-dependent tax as follows: 
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Starting from an optimum where all the first order conditions with respect to the various 
government’s instruments ( , {, }, {, } , i iiI i j i j iIjJ K by by τ ∈∈ ∈ ) are satisfied, consider the following 
experiment: increase marginally all the after-tax labor incomes assigned to the various young 
workers,  , and decrease by  i b ( ) 11 K r τ +−
ij b
() 11 K r τ ⎡⎤ −+ − ⎣⎦
 all the after-tax labor incomes assigned to the 
various middle-aged workers,  . To assess the effect of this policy experiment, what is 
required is to multiply by   the set of the first order conditions with respect to 
the various  , and then to sum them up with the set of first order conditions with respect to 
the various  . Taking into account that, under a nonlinear AD tax, young workers are 
prevented from choosing a bundle on the income tax that applies to the middle-aged-workers, 
and vice versa, one can easily recognize that the effect of the policy experiment that we are 
considering is to leave unaffected the expected lifetime utilities of all agents. The reason is 
that for all agents, including those who were planning to behave as mimickers, the present 
value of lifetime disposable income is not affected. The only behavioral effect is given by a 
change in the savings behavior of young workers. Specifically, young workers marginally 
increase their savings in the first period in order to keep consuming the same amount of 
material goods and leisure in all periods and possible states of the world. Thus, the policy 
experiment that we are considering is going to have no effect both on the government’s 
objective function (and this happens irrespective on whether the social welfare function is of 
the maximin type, as in our example, or of any other type) and on the set of self-selection 
constraints faced by the government. The only effect that we are left to consider is the effect 
on the aggregate production constraint. Rewriting the aggregate production constraint as 
ij b
i b
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and denoting by μ  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production constraint, the 
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where the fact that the expression above is equal to zero descends from the assumption that 
we started from an optimum where all the first order conditions to the government’s problem 
were satisfied. 
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the equation above can be simplified to: 




ii i j ii i j
ii j ii j
rr f





⎡⎤ ⎡ +− +−
















given that, with perfectly competitive markets, factors earn their marginal products implying 
that ' rfδ =− . 
We can therefore conclude that, by combining the various first order conditions to the 
government’s problem under a nonlinear AD tax, one can derive the golden rule condition 
even in the absence of debt policy. 
 
Appendix C. The nonlinear AID tax and the conditions for golden rule. 
In Appendix B we showed that debt policy is redundant to achieve the golden rule condition 
when the government is empowered with a nonlinear AD tax. The proof crucially relied on 
the fact that an AD tax makes impossible for workers to implement mimicking strategies 
where they choose when young an income bundle intended for middle aged, or vice versa. 
Given that this condition is no longer satisfied under an AID tax, it should not be surprising 
that the first order conditions of the government’s problem do not allow to recover the golden 
rule condition in the absence of debt policy. To realize that this is the case one can follow a 
procedure similar to that employed in Appendix C. Starting from an optimum where all the 
first order conditions with respect to the various government’s instruments 
( , {, }, {, } , i iiI i j i j iIjJ K by by τ ∈∈ ∈ ) are satisfied, consider the following experiment: increase 
marginally all the after-tax labor incomes assigned to the various young workers,  , and  i b  45
decrease by  ( 11 ) K r τ +−
ij b
 all the after-tax labor incomes assigned to the various middle-aged-
workers,  . Under an AID tax nothing guarantees that for all agents, including those who 
were planning to behave as mimickers, the present value of lifetime disposable income is left 
unaffected by the reform. In particular, the reform would change the present value of lifetime 
disposable income for those agents planning to mimic by choosing a deviating strategy which 
entails picking at some age an income bundle intended for agents of different age. For 
mimickers planning to implement such deviating strategies, the reform would not be welfare-




implies that we are prevented from combining the first order conditions with respect to the 
various b  and   to attain the golden rule condition rn = . Formally, the effect of the reform 
would take the following form: 
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where the self-selection term captures how the self-selection constraints faced by the 
government are affected by the circumstance that the reform changes the expected utility 
associated with some deviating strategies.
27 Due to the presence of a non-zero self-selection 
term in the above equation, the golden rule condition  n =  (which would make the first line 
of the equation equal to zero, as we have seen in Appendix B) cannot be a solution to the 
equation.
28 
Appendix D. The optimal interest tax rate under a nonlinear income tax. 
To obtain an analytical expression for the optimal interest income tax rate one can adapt the 
procedure followed by Blomquist and Micheletto (2008). For this purpose, we should 










 the various first order conditions with respect to   and then 
sum up the resulting set of equations with the first order condition with respect to 
ij b
K τ . Notice 
                                                 
26 An increase (resp.: reduction) would occur when the deviating strategy entails picking when middle-aged 
(resp.: young) a bundle intended for a young (resp.: middle-aged) worker. 
27 The fact that the expression is equal to zero descends also in this case from the assumption that we started 
from an optimum where all the first order conditions to the government’s problem were satisfied. 
28 The self-selection term would only vanish if, at the solution to the government’s problem under a nonlinear 
AID tax, there were no binding self-selection constraints where a worker of a given age is tempted to pick a 
bundle intended for a worker of a different age. Notice that in this special case the welfare gain of switching 
from a nonlinear AID to a nonlinear AD tax would be nil.   46
that the policy experiment of marginally increasing  K τ , while at the same time raising all the 









+ ⎢ +− ⎣⎦
⎥ , leaves unaffected the expected utility of all non-deviating 
agents. This is however not the case for mimickers. The reason is that the change in the 
various   is based on the savings behavior of non-deviating agents, since it is tailored to 
keep unchanged their expected utility. However, deviating agents will in general save to a 
different extent than non-deviating agents, and therefore the adjustment in the various   will 
in general change their expected utility. Thus, the reform affects both the expected utility of 
mimickers and the resource constraint faced by the government. Moreover, starting from an 
optimum where all the first order conditions to the government’s problem are satisfied, the 
sum of the effects of the reform on the set of self-selection constraints and on the resource 
constraint has to be equal to zero. The resulting equation can be used to provide an implicit 
characterization for the optimal level of the interest income tax rate. After some 




i i σ λ  the Lagrange multiplier associated to the self-selection 
constraint requiring a young type i worker not to engage in the deviating strategy 
i σ , one 
obtains the following formula, where a tilde has been used to denote Hicksian demands:
29 
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Given that under a nonlinear AD tax we have  ' rn f n δ = ⇒= +  and that the same condition 
holds under a nonlinear AID tax when debt policy is available, in these cases the condition 
implicitly characterizing the optimal interest income tax rate can be simplified to: 
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From the condition above it is apparent that, in the presence of a nonlinear tax on labor 
income, the value of the optimal interest income tax rate crucially hinges on the difference 
between the savings behavior of a deviating- and a non-deviating agent, for all the self-
selection constraints that are binding at a solution to the government’s problem. Given that a 
switch from a nonlinear AID to a nonlinear AD tax is likely to produce significant changes in 
 
29 The formula can be viewed as a generalization of eq. (9) in Blomquist and Micheletto (2008).   47
the pattern of binding self-selection constraints, one should expect that the level of the optimal 
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